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RECENT DECISIONS
that tribunal promises to be of great interest in view of the conflicting
opinions on the subject in the lower courts.
E. F. A.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEPARATION OF POWERS-DELEGATION
TO PRESIDENT OF POWER To DECLARE EMBAIuGo.-Pursuant to the
authority vested in him on May 28, 1934, by a Joint Resolution of
Congress,1 the President issued a proclamation 2 prohibiting the sale
of munitions in the United States or its territories, to any of the
countries engaged in armed conflict in the Chaco. To an indictment
charging defendants with conspiracy to sell machine guns to one of
the belligerents, defendants demurred on the ground that the Joint
Resolution is unconstitutional, inasmuch as it effects an invalid dele-
gation of legislative power to the executive. On appeal from a judg-
ment sustaining the demurrer,3 held, judgment reversed. The legis-
lation was aimed at regulating foreign relations and not domestic
affairs, and as such it is not repugnant to the Federal Constitution.4
The United States of America v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., et al.,
- U. S. -, 57 Sup. Ct. 216 (1936).
Perhaps no other phase of Constitutional Law has aroused greater
national controversy during the present administration than the ques-
tion of the delegation of legislative power to the Executive. On two
momentous occasions r the Supreme Court struck a lethal blow at the
very vitals of the President's "New Deal Program". It reiterated in
no uncertain terms the principle enunciated in the maxim "Delegata
potestas non potest delegar??'-delegated powers may not be delegated.
The instant case, however, differs from its antecedents in that it
1 "Resolved * * * that if the President finds that the prohibition of sale of
arms and munitions of war in the United States to those countries now engaged
in armed conflict in the Chaco may contribute to the reestablishment of peace
between those countries, and * * * if he makes proclamation to that effect, it
shall be unlawful to sell * * * any arms or munitions of war * * * until other-
wise ordered by the President or Congress." 48 STAT. 811 (1934).248 STAT. 1744 (1934).
' United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export., 14 F. Supp. 230 (S. D. N. Y.
1936).
'Art. I, § 1: "All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives." Article I, § 8, par. 18 provides that Congress shall have the
power "To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by the Constitution
in the government of the United States, or in any department or office thereof."
SPanama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 55 Sup. Ct. 241 (1935)
A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. 5. 495, 55 Sup. Ct.
837 (1935). Of course in these decisions another vital issue played a greatpart-the question whether t  co s themselves would be constitution l, h d
they been formulated by Congress itself, leaving the President to fill in the
details.
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presents the novel question whether the challenged delegation is vul-
nerable ,to attack even though it confines itself exclusively to external
and foreign affairs. That there are fundamental differences between
the two classes of powers, national and international, is a principle
buttressed by precedent and reason. Precedent, because from the
Administration of Washington to that of recent times, Presidents
have issued proclamations and executive orders affecting the foreign
policy of our nation, and these were without any stronger semblance
of Constitutional sanction than the embargo herein assailed. 6 This
has also the support of reason because the exercise of international
powers is a necessary incident of sovereignty.7 The two are insep-
arable, for there can be no nation without the attributes of nationality.
To wage war, make peace, conclude treaties, and to otherwise par-
ticipate in the activities of nations, are powers vested in the Federal
Government independent of the Constitution.8 In fact, the former
preceded the latter.9 No sooner were these powers relinquished by
"'His Britannic Majesty" than they were reinvested in the "United
States of America" as the indispensable concomitants of sovereignty.
This conceded, it then must follow as an inescapable conclusion that
the President alone, as our Chief Executive, is the logical and best
qualified representative to carry on the negotiations in matters per-
taining to international relationships. 10 For, in a field replete with a
multitude of intricate problems, the consequences of which are far-
Ch. 41, 1 Stat. 372 (1794) was an act authorizing the President to lay,
regulate, invoke embarges "whenever in his opinion the public safety shall so
require". Of the same significance are also 1 STAT. 401 (1794) ; c. 53, 1 STAT.
444 (1795) ; c. 53, § 5, 1 STAT. 566 (1798) ; c. 2, 1 STAT. 615 (1799); c. 10,
2 STAT. 9 (1800) ; 30 STAT. 739 (1898) ; 37 STAT. 630 (1912); 42 STAT. 361
(1922) (the last two statutes pertained to the prohibition of the exportation of
coal and other war materials). In all of these acts a wide latitude of discretion
was granted to the President without restrictions of narrow and definite
standards. For an exhaustive record of legislation, presented in a chronological
order, see HART, THE ORDINANCE-MAKING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT (1925)
69 et seq.; COMER, LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE
AUTHORITIES (1927) 15.
'Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U. S. 299, 36 Sup. Ct. 106 (1915); Burnet v.
Brooks, 288 U. S. 378, 396, 53 Sup. Ct. 457 (1933).
'Had the Constitution not mentioned them they would have been implied as
a matter of course. To acquire territory by discovery and occupation, to expel
undesirable aliens, and to make such international agreements as do not consti-
tute treaties in the Constitutional sense, are likewise powers not expressly
granted to the Federal Government, but are, nevertheless, an inalienable part
thereof. Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202, 212, 11 Sup. Ct. 80 (1890);
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 705, et seq., 13 Sup. Ct. 1016
(1893) ; Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U. S. 583, 32 Sup. Ct. 593 (1911).
'Even before the adoption of the Declaration of Independence, the Conti-
nental Congress had already exercised powers of war and peace, and raised an
army and created a navy. 1 WILSON, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (1902)
193-201.
10 "The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations
and its sole representative with foreign nations," statement by Marshall before
the House of Representatives. ANNALS, 6TH CONG. COL. 613 (1800).
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reaching and of the greatest magnitude, the utmost caution and secrecy
must often be exercised."1 On certain occasions, sudden decision and
unfettered discretion are unequivocally essential. Neither Congress
nor any of its working groups can cope with these significant problems
as efficiently as the President with his corps of adroit and confidential
advisers. Large bodies move slowly and cannot easily adapt them-
selves to rapidly changing conditions; nor can they possess the inti-
mate knowledge of important developments possessed by the respon-
sible individual negotiator. Hence, in foreign affairs, the Chief Exec-
utive must be given unmitigated freedom of action.12 To hold other-
wise would raise insuperable obstacles in the way of the proper exer-
cise of government.
The fear is expressed by some 13 that if the principle of individual
negotiation is applied broadly it might destroy Constitutionalism and
popular sovereignty with a few strokes of the pen. However, this
objection is groundless, if the said powers of negotiation are subordi-
nated to the provisions of the Constitution applicable thereto. The
President alone may negotiate a treaty, but the Constitution requires
its ratification by the Senate. Without such ratification the treaty is
of no effect. Likewise, the power to lay an embargo may be exercised
by the President only after the requisite Congressional authority has
been granted. Thus, the fear that such powers in the hands of the
Executive are conducive to autocracy and dictatorship, is devoid of
truth and reason. An unbroken line of precedents disproves this con-
tention. An impressive array of kindred legislation has been enacted
during the past century and a half without a sound of judicial pro-
test.14 Neither was our democratic system of government found to
have been adversely affected thereby.
'
1When Washington was requested to lay before the House of Represen-
tatives the documents relating to the negotiation of the Jay treaty, he expressed
his refusal as follows: "The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution,
and their success must often depend on secrecy; and * * * a full disclosure of
all the measures, demands, or eventual concessions which have been proposed or
contemplated would be extremely impolitic; for this might have a pernicious
ihfluence on future negotiations * * *. The necessity of such caution and
secrecy was one cogent reason for vesting the power of making treaties in the
President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, the principle on which
that body was formed confining it to a small number of members." 1 MESSAGES
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT (1895) 194.
' Mr. Justice Cardozo, in his dissenting opinion, said: "There must be
sensible approximation, there must be elasticity of adjustment, in response to
the practical necessities of government, which cannot foresee the developments
of tomorrow in their nearly infinite variety. In the complex life of today, the
business of government could not go on without the delegation in greater or
lesser degree, of the power to adapt the rule to the swiftly moving facts".
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 55 Sup. Ct. 837 (1935).
1 J. D. HILL, PRESENT PROBLEMS IN FOREIGN POLI Y (1919) 163.
•' The field of legislative delegation may be conveniently classified into four
major groups: The period between 1789-1815 witnessed a limited grant of
discretionary power except in connection with the problem of protecting the
neutral commerce from French decrees and English orders in Council; from
1815 to the outbreak of the War of Secession in 1861, there were scattered but
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While sustaining the Joint Resolution, the Court followed the
line of least resistance by basing its decision on a principle which has
never been questioned by judicial authority, namely, the plenary and
exclusive power of the President in the negotiation of international
affairs. But this overcaution was superfluous. It was held in The
Aurora v. United States,15 that it was. competent for Congress to make
the revival of a prior act dependent on the President's determination
of certain facts which, when ascertained, he shall declare by proc-
lamation.
In Field v. Clark,1 6 the Court upheld a statute which made the
suspension of an act contingent upon the finding of certain facts by
the President. In its opinion the Court stated that the statute did not
"in any real sense, invest the President with the power of legislation"
for "he was the mere agent of the law-making department to ascertain
and declare the event upon which its expressed will was to take effect".
In Buttfield v. Stranahan7 the Court also sustained a statute,
which conferred upon the Secretary of the Treasury the power to
establish, upon the recommendation of a board of experts "uniform
standards of purity, quality, and fitness for consumption of all kinds of
tea imported into the United States".
In another noteworthy case the Court sustained the authority
given to the President by the Trading With the Enemy Act to dis-
pose of enemy property "in the light of facts and conditions arising in
the progress of war". 18 The same policy moved the Court to likewise
uphold the act authorizing the Radio Commission to assign wave
lengths to various stations "as public convenience, interest, or neces-
sity requires". 19
The foregoing decisions, each one an invaluable signpost on the
road of progressive judicial construction,2 0 afford adequate Constitu-
tional sanction for the Joint Resolution attacked in the instant case.
For it, too, lays down the general policy of Congress, the establish-
not frequent delegations; during the period of the War and Reconstruction, from
1861 to 1875, rule-making powers of great importance were delegated to the
President; from 1875 to 1917, there were delegations, but none centered around
any central problem as in times of emergency; but the period of 1917-1918
witnessed an avalanche of delegated powers. From the above we may deduce
that delegation loomed largest during periods of actual and commercial warfare.
See HART, 10c. cit. supra note 6.
' 7 Cranch 382, 388, 3 L. ed. 378 (U. S. 1813) (Non-Intercourse Act).
"143 U. S. 649, 683, 12 Sup. Ct. 495, 501 (1892) (Reciprocal Trade Act).
-1 192 U. S. 470, 496, 24 Sup. Ct. 349, 352 (1904).
'
8 United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U. S. 1, 12, 47 Sup. Ct. 1, 5
(1926).
2' Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Brothers Co., 289 U. S. 266, 279,
53 Sup. Ct. 627 (1933).
0 "The Constitution of the United States is not a mere lawyer's document;
it is a vehicle of life, and its spirit is always the spirit of the age. As the life
of the nation changes, so must the interpretation of the document which con-
tains it change * * * to be determined not only by the original intention of those
who drew the paper, but by the exigencies and new aspect of life itself".
WILsoN, CONSTUTIONAL GOvERNMENTIN ME UNITE= STATES (1921) 69.
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ment of peace among those engaged in armed conflict in the Chaco, as
a standard of guidance for the President in his ascertainment of fact
and proclamation thereof. Hence, the act is also sustainable in accor-
dance with the doctrine of stare decisis.
A.F.
CONTRACTS-IMPLIED CONDITIoN-ATTORNEY'S FEEs.-Plain-
tiff rented a talking-picture machine to defendant for use in the latter's
theatre for a period of ten years at a fixed rental, the entire sum to
be paid during the first two years. No proision was made for the
termination of liability for the agreed compensation in the event of
the destruction of the theatre. The defendant could assign this con-
tract, which in fact he did, provided he remained liable as a guarantor.
The contract further provided for recovery of attorney's fees incurred
by plaintiff in collection of rent. Approximately seven months after
the start of the contract period a fire destroyed the premises but left
uninjured the equipment. Upon the request of the defendant's as-
signees the plaintiff removed the machine from the theatre ruins and
has held it for defendant's use. In an action for rent the plaintiff re-
covered the entire balance of the consideration for the ten-year period
plus an arbitrary sum of five hundred dollars for attorney's fees. De-
fendant appealed on the ground that the continued existence of the
theatre during the term of the agreement was an implied condition to
his liability and that the destruction of the theatre and the voluntary
removal and retention of the apparatus by the plaintiff ended all lia-
bility. Held, affirmed, in part. No condition will be implied where
such a condition might have been provided against in the contract.'
The value of attorney's fees, however, in absence of stated amount in
contract, must be recovered on a quantum ineruit basis, and the lower
court was in error in granting an arbitrary figure. General Talking
Pictures Corporation v. Rinas, 248 App. Div. 164, 288 N. Y. Supp.
266 (1st Dept. 1936).
,Subsequent or intervening impossibility of performance, as a de-
fense, should be clearly distinguished from impossibility arising at the
time the contract is made, for in the latter instance the contract may
be avoided in some cases on the ground of lack of consideration, if
the consideration is obviously and on the face of the contract impos-
sible or in other cases on the ground of mutual mistake of fact.2 It
is with the former problem that we are now concerned. The general
rule is that a contracting party is bound by the unconditional promise
he has made even though performance becomes impossible by reason
'Harnony v. Bingham, 12 N. Y. 99 (1854).
21916 F. L. R. A. 10; Beebe v. Johnson, 19 Wend. 500 (N. Y. 1838).
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